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INTRODUCTION – THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY IN THE EU 
 
With more than 130 scheduled airlines and a network of over 450 
airports air transport makes a key contribution to the European economy. 
Every year, more than 800 million people in the EU travel by air.1 During 
the summer holiday peak more than 30,000 scheduled flights take place 
daily.2 The industry employs more than 3 million people and contributes 
more than EUR 120 bn to European GDP.3 
In commercial aviation there are two distinct models of transport 
with regard to route network organisation. These are the hub-and-spoke and 
point-to-point systems. The first is based on a system of large airports, hubs. 
In a nutshell, if a passenger wished to journey from point A to point B, he or 
she would use a regional airline to reach the nearest hub, from which travel 
then continues to the hub closest to the destination. The passenger would 
then use a regional airline to reach that destination.4 The latter is based on 
an extensive network to allow connections between any of its points, any 
pair of cities. 5  Each system has its own advantages and disadvantages 
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1 The most recent data available are from 2008. In this year European carriers serviced 798 
million passengers, which is a 0.7% increase on the prev ious year. Of this number, there 
were 170.6 million passengers (21.4%) on the national routes, 345 million passengers 
(43.2%) on the intra-European routes and 282.3 million passengers (35.4%) on the cross -
border routes. European Commission, DLR (Deutsches  Zentrum für Luft- Und Raumfahrt 
e.V.) - Analyses of the European air transport market (Annual report 2008). 
2 ibid.  
3 Eurostat, Key figures on Europe - 2009 Edition. On the competitiveness of the market, see 
also: Damien  Neven, Paul Seabright,   European  Industrial  Policy:  The  Airbus  Case, 
Université de Lausanne, Ecole des HEC/DEEP 1995. 
4 The new Airbus A380 was designed for long-haul routes between hub-type airports, as is 
the fourth generation of the Boeing 747, the version 8 Intercontinental. 
5  The  new  Boeing  787-8  Dreamliner,  currently  undergoing  the  flight  testing  and 
certification process, was designed to operate according to the point-to-point model. The 
direct predecessor size-wise is the Boeing 767-300 which could operate under both of these 13  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1: 1 
 
 
resulting  from  factors  both  technical  and  economic.  A  more  detailed 
analysis of these systems lies beyond the scope of this paper, although a 
concise outline of them is required.6 
Association of airlines into intercarrier agreements, so-called Airline 
Alliances, began in the 1930s. However, the first major alliance was created 
in  1989  between  KLM  (Koninkiijke  Luchtvaart  Maatschappij)  and 
Northwest.7 The real boom in Airline Alliances occurred at the turn of the 
century. Three main factors are responsible for this phenomenon. The first 
was the deregulation of the airline industry in the United States in 1978.8 
The second was an increase in the number of states that joined the open 
skies agreements, which opened their markets to foreign air carriers. 9 The 
third decisive factor was liberalization and creation of a common market for 
passenger transport in the EU, begun in 1993.10 
Currently, three major Airline Alliances – Star Alliance,11 Skyteam12 
and  Oneworld13  –  control  more  than  70  percent  of  the  market.14  This 
                                                                                                                            
models. Due to operational considerations (airport congestion, duration of flight etc.), some 
types of aircraft (i.e. T7-200ER, B737-900ER) could be used in both point-to-point and 
hub-and-spoke operations. Also, the Airbus A350XWB currently under development will 
operate mostly according to this model as it is being designed to compete with the Boeing 
Dreamliner and 777-200LR. 
6  See  also:  Gillaume  Burghouwt,  Airline  Network  Development  in  Europe  and  its 
Implications for Airport Planning (Ashgate Publishing 2007). 
7 For a detailed analysis see also: Angela Cheng-Jui Lu, International Airline Alliances: EC 
Competition  Law  /  US  Antitrust  Law  and  International  Transport  (Kluwer  Law 
International 2003). 
8 The deregulation of 1978 removed government control over fares, routes and market entry 
for new airlines. The act came into force on 24/11/78 (The Airline Deregulation Act,  Pub. 
L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705). 
9  The Chicago Convention of 1944 provides a multilateral model in international air 
transport with regard to requirements for the operation of commercial carriers. There is also 
the US-EU open skies agreement [2007] OJ L134/4; ASEAN countries would soon sign a 
similar  agreement.  See  also:  Ruwantissa  Abeyratne,  ‘Effects  of  United  States/European 
Union  open  skies  on  competition’  (2006)  40  Journal  of  World  Trade  1099  and  Liz 
Heffernan, Conor McAuilffe, ‘External relations in the air transport sector: the Court of 
Justice and the open skies agreements’ (2003) 28 European Law Review 601. 
10 The so-called Third Air Package includes Council Regulation (EEC) 2407/92 of 23 July 
1992 on licensing of air carriers [1992] OJ L240/1, Council Regulation (EEC) 2408/92 of 
23 July 1992 on access for Community air carriers to intra-Community air routes [1992] OJ 
L240/8 and Council Regulation (EEC) 2409/92 of 23 July 1992 on fares and rates for air 
services [1992] OJ L240/15. A full catalog of acts regulating air transport together with 
relevant decisions of the Commission, ECJ case law and analytical and statistical materials 
are  available  at  the  EC  website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/handbook/handbook_en.htm (accessed 20 December 2010). 
See also: George Williams, The Airline Industry and the Impact of Deregulation, (Ashgate 
Publishing 1993); Peter Nijkamp, ‘Liberalisation of Air Transport in Europe: The Survival 
of the Fittest?’ (1996) 3 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkwirtschaft und Statistik 257; 
Claudio  A.  Piga,  Maria  José  Gil-Moltó  (eds)  ‘The  liberalisation  of  the  European  civil 
aviation  industry:  economic  and  policy  implications’  (2007)  97  Rivista  di  politica 
economica. 
11 Star Alliance was founded in 1997 and has 28 member airlines (including PLL LOT). 
The Alliance has approximately 623.53 million passengers annually and more than 21,200 
daily departures to 1,160 airports in 18 1 countries. In 2008 it generated approximately 
$151.51 bn in profit and held around 29.3% of the global market [source: Alliance official 
website: www.staralliance.com; accessed 6 April 2011]. 
12 Sky Team was founded in 2000 and has 13 member airlines. It carries approximately 
384.7  million  passengers  annually  between  898  locations.  In  2008  it  generated 2011]  RELEVANT MARKET IN COMMERCIAL AVIATION OF                        
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situation raises certain challenges in the context of the functioning of EU 
competition  rules,  and  thus  also  for  a  market  regulator,  the  European 
Commission. This emphasises the importance of the proper indication of 
relevant  market  since it translates  directly into  the effectiveness  of legal 
instruments in ensuring uninterrupted competition on a given market.15 
 
 
I. THE NOTION AND RATIONALE OF RELEVANT MARKET IN ACQUIS 
COMMUNAUTAIRE 
 
The concept of relevant market is an important instrument of EU 
Competition Law especially in the field of merger control and prevention of 
abuse of a dominant position. Semantically, the term used for the purposes 
of EU Competition Law need not be consistent with its counterpart in the 
economy. This is due to the difference in situational context and function 
that both of these classifications serve.16  
The  key  concept  in  identifying  the  product  market  is 
substitutability.17 In other words, whether one product can be replaced by 
another.18  Supply-side substitution relates to the possibility of turning to 
products that are not yet offered b y particular competitors, but that would 
readily be offered by them in the event of a higher price of the product in 
question. Demand-side substitution relates to the possibility of a customer 
switching to alternative products that are already available on the market.19  
This is an essential consideration  whether other suppliers  may decide to 
enter  a  new market  and  what  costs  they  are  therefore  willing  to  pay. 
Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes 
of  Community  competition  law  pointed  to  two  conditions,  fulfilment  of 
which  would  lead  this  potential  competition  to  reach  a  decision  to  start 
operations on a new market.20 The former is the ability to start immediately 
on a new market while the latter relates to a lack of signif icant increase in 
cost associated with an expansion.21 
From  the  demand -side,  the  price  of  a  product,  its  features  and 
availability and the terms under which it is offered should be taken on 
account when assessing whether it constitutes an alternative on the market.22 
                                                                                                                            
approximately $99.78 bn in profit and held around 20.6% of the global market [source: 
Alliance official website: www.skyteam.com; accessed 6 April 2011].  
13 Oneworld was founded in 1999 and has 11 member airlines. It carries 328.63 million 
passengers  annually  between  727  locations.  In  2008  Alliance  generated  $99.78  billion 
profit  and  held  around  23.2%  of  the  global  market  [source:  Alliance  official  website: 
www.oneworld.com; accessed 6 April 2011]. 
14 Cheng-Jui Lu (n 7) 9. 
15 For analysis of competition in the market from an economic standpoint see also: Piga, 
Gil-Moltó, Aguiló Pérez (n 10). 
16 Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden, ‘The Economics of Competition’ in Jonathan Faull, 
Ali Nikpay (eds), The EC Law of Competition (Oxford University Press 2007) 39. 
17  Commission  Notice  on  the  definition  of  the  relevant  market  for  the  purposes  of 
Community competition law, [1997] OJ C 372/5. 
18 ibid. 
19 Peeperkorn, Verouden (n 16) 41. 
20 Commission Notice (n 17). 
21 ibid. 
22 ibid. 15  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1: 1 
 
 
While the underlying idea is clear, in practice it is often rather difficult and 
sometimes impossible to make that assessment.23 
The need for a framework to assess economic substitutability has led 
to the development of the SSNIP test (Small but Significant Non-transitory 
Increase in Price, sometimes called the hypothetical monopolist test). The 
test suggests the following line of enquiry: postulate a hypothetical small (5-
10% on average) increase in the price at which the product in question is 
offered on the market.24 At the same time, prices of the alternative products 
are held constant.25 If as a result customers would switch to another product, 
then this alternative product must be considered a substitute. 26  Thus the 
SSNIP test serves as a benchmark as to whether it would be profitable for a 
supplier  (the  hypothetical  monopolist)  to  raise  the  price  for  the  product 
concerned  or  not.27  Hence  the  relevant  market  from  the  supply -side 
perspective  is,  to  quote  B.  Owen  and  S.  Wildmane,  ‘something  worth 
monopolizing’.28 In the absence of alternative products, the supplier having 
obtained a monopoly would be free to increase prices, ultimately increasing 
profits.29 
Geographic market is a distinguishable area in which enterprises 
concerned are involved in the su pply and demand of products or services. 
The  conditions  of  competition  should  be  sufficiently  homogenous. 30 
Conceptual approach to geographic market can again be based on the SSNIP 
test. From the supply-side this assesses the possibility of enterprises located 
outside a certain geographic area beginning immediate supply into that area. 
Demand-side substitution relates to the extent to which customers in a given 
geographic area are able and willing to switch to suppliers located outside 
this area. Therefore the geographic market will be the one in which external 
enterprises are unable to begin their operations swiftly and customers have 
an inability (are unable or unwilling) to switch to suppliers located outside 
the given area.31 
                                                 
23 Peeperkorn, Verouden (n 16) 42. 
24 Charles Rowley, Anne Rathbone, ‘Political Economy of Antitrust’ in Manfred Neumann, 
Jürgen  Weigand  (eds)  The  International  Handbook  of  Competition  (Edward  Elgar 
Publishing 2004) 181. 
25 ibid. 
26 ibid., also Peeperkorn, Verouden (n 16) 42. 
27 ibid. 
28  Quoted in Simon Bishop, Mike Walker,  The  Economics  of  EC  Competition  Law: 
Concepts, Application and Measurement (Sweet & Maxwell 2002) 84. 
29 The lack of real competition may give a monopolist less of an incentive to invest in new 
ideas or consider consumer welfare. It can also be argued that even if the monopolist 
benefits from economies of scale, they will have little incentive to control production costs 
and 'X' inefficiencies will mean that there will be no real cost savings. See also: Arthur 
Sullivan, Steven M Sheffrin, Economics: Principle in Action (Pearson/Prentice Hall 2007); 
Richard O Zerbe Jr, Economic Efficiency in Law and Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2001). 
30 Commission Notice (n 17). See also: Mario Monti,  EC Competition Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) 139. 
31 It must be noted that the SSNIP test only measures competition based on price and thus 
cannot be considered a catch-all or fully sufficient tool for defining markets. The reliability 
and analytical value of the SSNIP test could be hindered by the so -called  ‘cellophane 
paradox’. This term describes incorrect reasoning regarding identification of substitutes on 
a given market. It may happen therefore that in using the SSNIP test the relevant market is 
defined too broadly, including products which are not substitutes, and thus assessment of 2011]  RELEVANT MARKET IN COMMERCIAL AVIATION OF                        
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Criteria for product market and geographic market are used to define 
relevant market for the purpose of EU Competition Law. This serves as a 
tool for an assessment of whether companies are, or will be, in a position to 
exercise  market  power.  It  thereby  allows  for  a  preliminary  screening  of 
cases to see whether there may be a competitive issue or not. It is especially 
useful in the context of antitrust analysis. 
The  ECJ  in  the  Nouvelles  Frontiéres  and  French  Seamen  cases 
stated that maritime and air transport are outside the scope of the common 
transport policy.32 The Court held that inclusion of these sectors in a special 
legal regime of transport policy would require explicit provision in the 
Treaties.33 As such, competition rules from part of the general rules of the 
Treaty apply fully in the airline industry.34 
 
 
II. MARKET DEFINITION IN RESPECT OF SCHEDULED AIR 
TRANSPORT OF PASSENGERS 
 
The point of departure  for determining the relevant  market  in  air 
service is pointing out the basic categories of air carriers in terms of the 
nature of their services, their business models and the mutual competition 
between them. 
The first,  largest  and most important  category is  ‘legacy’ or ‘full 
service  network  carrier’  (FNSC).35  These  are  airlines  that  focus  on 
providing  a  wide  range  of  pre-flight  and  onboard  services,  including 
different service classes, and connecting flights. Since most FNSCs operate 
a hub-and-spoke model, this group of airlines are usually also referred to as 
hub-and-spoke airlines.36 These airlines typically have an extensive route 
network including long-haul intercontinental flights. Air carriers in this 
category carry nearly 10 million passengers annually.37 
The  second  category  is  ‘low-cost  carrier’  (LCC).  These  airlines 
focus on cost reduction in order to implement a price leadership strategy.38 
They offer a so -called no-frills service (no onboard meals, no premium 
                                                                                                                            
the market power of a given enterprise would be incorrect. This argument calls for some 
caution in applying the SSNIP test. Evidence that, say, a 5% price rise would lead to more 
than  a  10-15%  decrease  in  demand  should  not  be  regarded  as  stating  that  a  market 
delimitation should be wider. See also: Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and 
Practice (Cambridge University Press 2005) 105. 
32 Joined Cases 209/84, 210/84, 211/84, 212/84, 213/84 and 214/84,  Criminal proceedings 
against Lucas Asjes and Others, Andrew Gray and Others, Jaques Maillot and Others, and 
Léo  Ludwig  and  Others  (Nouvelles  Frontiéres  )  [1968]  ECR  1425  and  Case  167/73 
Commission v France (French Seamen) [1974] ECR 359. 
33 Nouvelles Frontiéres (n 30) paras 31, 40-42. 
34  ibid. paras 32, 45. For details see Martin Stainland,  Europe  of  the  Air?  The  Airline 
Industry and European Integration (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2008) 77-79. 
35 In most EU countries the national carrier operates as a FNSC. 
36 This is not entirely correct as most of the heavily hub -oriented carriers operate a hybrid 
model which includes a limited number of point -to-point services which do  not connect 
with a hub. 
37 European Commission, DLR (n 1) 47. 
38 See also: Ruwantissa Abeyratne, ‘The decision in the “Ryanair” case  – the low cost 
carrier phenomenon’ (2004) 39 European Transport Law: Journal of Laws and Economiscs 
585. 17  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1: 1 
 
 
cabins  etc.).  Connections,  short  to  medium,  are  held  generally  between 
airports of secondary importance as they offer lower fees (ground handling 
etc.).39 Furthermore, serving a smaller, uncongested airport enables LCCs to 
maximize aircraft utilization. The use of a young and homogenous fleet of 
medium-sized  aircraft  (typically  Boeing  737 -800/900/NG  or  Airbus 
319/320/321) usually leads to a reduction in fuel and maintenance an d, if 
large orders are placed at discounted prices, also capital costs. High density 
seating leads to lower unit costs in all categories and fixed costs (like ATC) 
can  be distributed among  more passengers. Annually, around 6 million 
passengers use LCC services and this number is constantly increasing.40 
The third category comprises regional carriers, also called commuter 
airlines or feeder airlines. These generally use smaller aircraft with high -
density seating (typically CRJ700/900/1000 or Embraer E-series, although, 
despite the general trend of regional aircraft becoming larger, some smaller 
airframes  are  also  in  operation)  and  restrict  their  flight  routes  to  a 
geographically limited area. Regional airlines often provide a feeder service 
for major air hubs. Furthermore, since these air carriers use small machines 
able to operate from shorter runaways, a service may travel to peripherally 
located  areas.  Regional  airlines  carry  around  one  million  passengers 
annually.41 
The last category is formed by holiday or  leisure carriers, often 
called charter airlines.42 These airlines provide non-schedule services and 
focus on transportation of tourists. Most holiday flights are not sold directly 
by the airline to the passengers, but are included in charter packages offered 
by tour operators.43 The operations of leisure carriers are especially wide -
spread in northern Europe where they provide ‘package holiday’ services to 
remote leisure locations. Charter airlines carry around 800,000 passengers 
per year, but the business is in constant decline mainly due to competition 
from low-cost carriers.44 
The point of departure for market definition in air transport is the so-
called ‘point-of-origin/point-of-destination’ (O&D) approach. According to 
this  approach,  every  combination  of  city  pairs  should  be  considered  a 
separate market from the passenger’s point of view. In this context, large 
network  carriers  operating  a  hub-and-spoke  system  have  argued  that 
network  effect  should  be  taken  into  account  in  defining  the  relevant 
market.45  Network  effect  relates  to  the  assumption  that  a  significant 
proportion of passengers would use the hub for connecting flights and 
therefore number of routes available from a given airport should be taken 
into account.46 
                                                 
39 See also: G Germà Bel, Xavier Fageda, ‘Privatisation, regulation and airport pricing: an 
empirical analysis for Europe’ (2010) 37 Journal of  Regulatory Economics 142. 
40 European Commission, DLR (n 1) 47. 
41 ibid. 
42 Nowadays many holiday flights are operated as scheduled services, albeit often seasonal. 
43 Monique Negnman, Maria Jaspers, Rita Wezenbeek, Joos Stragier, ‘Transport’, in Faull, 
Nikpay (n 16) 1579-1580. 
44  Rigas Doganis,  Flying off course. The Economics of International Airlines (3rd edn, 
Routledge 2002) 177-179. 
45 Negnman, Jaspers, Wezenbeek, Stragier (n 41) 1581-1582. 
46 ibid. 2011]  RELEVANT MARKET IN COMMERCIAL AVIATION OF                        
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The Commission acknowledges that in the business model of hub-
and-spoke  carriers  network  competition  is  relevant  from  the  supply-side 
perspective.47  However in the  United  Airlines/US  Airways  decision,  the 
Commission concluded that the existence of network effect is insufficient to 
modify  its  demand-side  approach.48  The  Commission  then  argued  that 
passengers are primarily concerned with getting from point A to point B and 
in the event of a price increase on a given route as a result of having a 
dominant carrier, it would be irrelevant to them whether this operator has an 
extensive  network  of  connections  where  it  competes  with  the  other 
airlines.49 
The demand-side approach preferred by the Commission does not 
mean that it ignores the network effect. In fact in the  Air France/KLM case 
the Commission implicitly indicated that demand for air services can also by 
generated  by  the  existence  of  network  effect,  especially  in  the  case  of 
corporate customers.50 
Furthermore, when defining the relevant market the Commission 
usually  takes  into  account  the  profile  of   the  passengers.  Two  main 
categories  can  be  distinguished  there.  Time-sensitive  passengers  focus 
mainly on flexibility.51 The primary criteria according to which they select 
an  airline  are  number  of  daily  flights,  the  location  of  the  airport, 
convenience of departure and arrival time and opportunity to rescheduled 
their reservation at short notice. The  non-time-sensitive passengers are in 
general more price-oriented.52 They require less flexibility and are willing to 
accept longer journey time. This classific ation largely coincides with the 
distinction between business and leisure travellers.53 
 
 
III. ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORT POSSIBILITIES 
 
Having  identified  the  relevant  O&D  market,  it  is  necessary  to 
consider  the  different  transport  possibilities  which  could  be  regarded  as 
substitutable  for  the  services  provided  by  the  air  carriers  in  question. 
Whether  the  potential  alternatives  are  viable  depends  on  a  multitude  of 
factors. Such assessment must therefore factor in the specific characteristics 
of each individual route.54  
For most of the intra-European routes the distance that passengers 
are willing to travel to reach a departure airport would be rather small. 
However, for long-haul flights the radius of an airport catchment area would 
                                                 
47 ibid. 1582-1583. 
48 United Airlines/US Airways (Case M.2041) [2001] OJ C270/131. 
49 ibid. 
50 Air France/KLM (Case M.3280) [2004] OJ C60/5, paras 10-16 and 130-135. 
51 Air France/Alitalia (COMP/A.38284/D2) Commission Decision 2004/841/EC [2004] OJ 
L362/17, para 11. 
52 ibid. 
53  KLM/Alitalia  (Case  JV.19)  [1999]  OJ  C184,  para  21;  SAS  Maersk  (Case 
COMP.D.2.37.444) [2001] OJ L265/15, para 30; Air France/Alitalia (n 51) paras 41, 44-
46; United Airlines/US Airways (n 48) para 18. 
54 Trevor Soames, ‘EC competition Law and Aviation: „caution optimism spreading its 
wings”’ (2006) 27 European Competition Law Review 599. 19  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1: 1 
 
 
grow significantly.55 Of course, at the end of the day, whether an adjacent 
airport would provide a suitable alternative depends on a number of factors, 
such  as  convenience  in  access  to  the  airport,  duration  of  the  journey, 
frequency of service and service features (price etc.). 
Another factor is the competition from low-cost carriers. Traditional 
carriers have over recent years faced increased competition from these 
airlines, so this factor is gaining in prominence. 56 For example, in 2008 the 
four largest low-cost carriers in Europe  – Ryanair, easyJet, Air Berlin and 
Flybe  –  performed  respectively  7,546,  6,382,  4,171  and  3,044  flights 
weekly. For comparison, the two largest European flag carriers – Lufthansa 
and Air France – offered 10,000-12,000 flights every week. The third and 
fourth  largest  national  carriers–  Iberia  and  British  Airways  (recently 
merged) – conducted 5,000-6,000 flights weekly.57 The service offered by 
the low-cost carriers will to a lesser extent provide an alternative for time -
sensitive customers, but for the non-time-sensitive passengers it is certainly 
a competitive offer.58 
Charter flights are not considered to be sufficiently substitutable for 
scheduled  flights,  and  certainly  not  for  time -sensitive  passengers  and 
flexibility-focused passengers, mainly due to the low frequency of flights.59 
However,  in  its  decision  in  British  Airways/SN  Brussels  airlines  the 
Commission  did  not  rule  out  that  under  certain  circumstances,  non-
scheduled services  may be a substitute for non-time-sensitive passengers.60 
Indirect  flights  may  pro vide  a  convenient  alternative  to  direct 
services, especially in the case of one -stop services.61 The decisive factors 
are the duration of a flight, the connection time, flight schedules and price. 
Generally, indirect flights are more likely to be considered an alternative to 
medium- to long-haul flights.62 
Alternative modes of transport, such as high -speed trains and road 
transport,  can  to  a  certain  extent  provide  a  suitable alternative  for  air 
transport.63 The rule of a thumb when comparing total travelling t ime of a 
flight service and an alternative mode of transport is to add two hours to the 
total flight time so as to factor in time required to reach the airport and 
airport procedures (check-in, luggage reclaim etc.). 64 For example, on the 
basis of this calculation the Commission concluded that the rail link from 
Brussels to London operated by the high-speed trains of the Eurostar line is 
a  viable  alternative  to  the  scheduled  air  service.  Generally,  for  time-
sensitive passengers an alternative means of transport may be a possible 
alternative only where travel time is not significantly longer. However, for 
                                                 
55 Negnman, Jaspers, Wezenbeek, Stragier (n 41) 1580. 
56 In context of Case T-196/04 Ryanair Ltd v  Commission [2008] II-3643. See. Ruwantissa 
Abeyratne, ‘The Decision in the „Ryanair” Case – The Low Cost Carrier Phenomenon’ 
(2004) 39 European Transport Law: Journal of Laws and Economics 585. 
57 European Commission, DLR, (n 1) 47. 
58 Air France/Alitalia (n 51) para 54-55. 
59 KLM/Alitalia (n 53)  paras 55-56; Air France/Alitalia (n 51) para 56. 
60British Airways/SN Brussels Airways (Case C.38.477) [2002] OJ C306/5 paras 29-32. 
61 Negnman, Jaspers, Wezenbeek, Stragier (n 41) 1580. 
62 ibid. 
63 ibid. 
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price-minded travellers travel time might be less important, and thus for 
them this option is more attractive.65 
 
 
IV. MARKET DEFINITION IN RESPECT OF AIR TRANSPORT OF 
CARGO 
 
A different  methodology  is  applicable when defining the relevant 
market in the case of the air cargo transport.66 Unlike passengers, freight can 
be  carried  on  economically  acceptable  terms  with  a  higher number  of 
stopovers. This is due to th e fact that time is not such a crucial factor in 
transport of freight, except in the case of perishable goods, the range of 
alternative methods is thus broader. The  relevant market in air freight 
transport is therefore in principle wider than in transport  of passengers. For 
intra-European routes the relevant market would be Europe-wide, including 
road transport and, to a lesser extent, transport by rail.67 In the event that one 
of the points of origin or destination is located outside the  EU the relevant 
market would cover the whole continent at least for those routes where local 
infrastructure allows onward connections.68 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Analysis of the factors contributing to the definition of the relevant 
market in the airline industry draws attention to the practical implications of 
such a definition. This merely recalls the fact that market definition is not a 
goal in itself, but an intermediate step for structuring an analysis. The aim of 
market definition is to analyze economic substitutability of products in a 
structured way, potentially helping reveal infringement of EU law.69 If this 
happens, the Commission, whose primary function is to act as guardian of 
the  Treaties,  shall  respond  appropriately  to  prevent  actual  or  potential 
distortions of the market created by ‘concerted practices’, abuse of dominant 
position and mergers.70 Every competition case involves extensive forensic 
work encompassing the identification and assessment of market and analysis 
of impact (actual or potential) of practices or proposed  actions by one or 
more airlines.71 Adequate definition of a relevant market which contributes 
to  the  effectiveness  of  regulatory  actions  is  therefore  essential  for 
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maintaining the overall competitiveness of the market and ensuring respect 
for passenger rights.72  
All of this boils down still to the question of how successful the 
Commission  has  been  in  protecting  and  promoting  opportunities  for 
competition. In other words, whether competition policy has succeeded or 
failed. The result of the Commission approac h seems to be a somewhat 
ambiguous  policy.  Mario  Monti,  when  competition  commissioner, 
expressed the opinion that the Commission should ‘not stand in the way of 
consolidation  provided  competition  concerns,  when  they  exist,  are 
addressed  in  a  satisfactory  way’.73  On  the  other  hand  Michael  Aryal, 
DGTREN’s director for air transport, remarked: ‘We fail consolidation. We 
support consolidation. ... Of course we cannot support this at the cost of 
competition”.74  It  seems  then  that  the  Commission  is  torn  between  two 
conflicting  goals,  competition  and  consolidation.  The  consolidation-
approval  approach  reflects  the  long-established  belief  that  European 
industry needs all the competitive edge it can obtain in the face of American 
challenges.75 In this case it is unclear  why the Ryanair-Aer Lingus merger 
was quashed. We can therefore observe a tension between competitiveness 
(on a global scale) and competition, and this raises the question of the extent 
of consumer choice. 
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